Avoid Issues in Operations: Be More Secure by Design
Would you feel comfortable flying in an aeroplane designed by engineers who only considered what might go wrong after they had built it?
‘Secure by Design’ (SbD) is not a technology, it is a set of principles to be adopted to improve business risk and resilience. It has strong similarity to conventional engineering practices, and it will save money by reducing wasteful rework.
The critical first step is to understand the risks that the solution will be exposed to. Like Failure Mode Analysis in conventional engineering, these inherent risks form an essential part of the solution requirements. The design can then be a collaborative and iterative exercise of review and enhancement to meet the security requirements.
Effort spent defining requirements before design and implementation is widely recognised to save time and money. The situation is no different with security requirements, but there are wider benefits as well, compared to addressing security late in the lifecycle:
- Security controls applied after design and implementation are more likely to restrict functionality, undermining overall user satisfaction and the return on investment
- Early engagement reduces the risk of budgets overruns, or having to accept inadequate security if you can’t secure the budget
- A well-documented set of risks, security controls and design decisions can then follow the solution through implementation and into operations, enabling future change to understand past rationale
- Above all else, late identification of risk and security requirements causes wasteful rework of the solution, which will cost time and money
The key to success is defining the system scope correctly. If the scope is too great and encompasses a number of separate systems, then the benefits are eroded and the exercise becomes more akin to a homogenous enterprise risk assessment. If the scope is too small, the number of systems becomes unwieldy and unsustainable to assess and manage.
It is not a Technology, and it is not New
Despite what you might believe from some of the cyber tech product sheets, SbD is not a technology (for that matter, Zero Trust, which we see as a valuable component of SbD practice, is not a technology either). It is a philosophy or strategy, a set of principles that bring efficiency, consistency, and discipline to cyber risk management. You may find tools that help you to adopt these principles, and the practice requires a sound understanding of technology, but above all SbD is a human endeavour.
Like many other buzzwords in the security community, SbD is frequently presented as something rather mystical, requiring specialist knowledge and attracting a new set of standards and vocabulary. We don’t hold with this concept; in our view, it ‘does exactly what it says on the tin’. It is about ensuring the system’s very design enforces security and mitigates risk rather than relying on sticking plasters applied after implementation. Whether those design features are preventative controls, controls to detect and respond to issues, or any other category, they will have been defined and tuned to the specific risks and characteristics of the solution in advance (and managed through life).
The concept is not new. The benefits of early security engagement have been known for some time. But sadly, this has been frequently ignored. As the cyber security industry matures, and the frequency and impact of cyber attacks on businesses increases, the call for this discipline has been increasing. Governments are starting to mandate it in the standards and security governance of technology programmes.
The Similarities between Digital and Conventional Engineering
Most engineering lifecycles, not just those related to digital solutions, recognise the importance of spending adequate time defining the requirements. At the start of the programme, the level of uncertainty will be at its greatest. The purpose of Requirements Engineering is to reduce that uncertainty so that design and implementation can proceed with direction and to minimise the number of ‘wrong turns’ that have to be unwound. If you do not reduce uncertainty as early as possible, the problems grow as they move downstream, and solving them then becomes a disheartening exercise in ‘pushing water uphill’.
Let us imagine that we want someone to build us a house. We would go to our local house building company and commission the job; if they get started immediately, the chances of the end result being anything like what we originally wanted would be almost zero. Where do we want our home located? How many bedrooms, bathrooms, and living rooms? What architectural style? What about the fixtures and fittings? We will identify everything wrong once the sub-optimal, ill-thought-out building is completed for our inspection. Putting those right at this stage will cost orders of magnitude more than they would have with an effective design phase. Worse, there will be many issues that we cannot put right without starting again, and, therefore, we will be left operating in a flawed and compromised solution.
Where do we Start?
So, how do we identify the security requirements for the design? What is Requirements Engineering in a security context? The security requirements are defined by the risks that the solution will be exposed to. One of the most important SbD principles emphases this by stating that you must ‘adopt a risk-driven approach’. These risks and your organisation’s appetite to accept risk determine the requirements for controls; or, to put it another way, the controls are required to mitigate the risk to a level that it is within your organisation’s appetite. Again, there are similarities with conventional engineering. Understanding the risks that the design must treat is similar to identifying the Failure Modes of an aircraft or other system.
The risks need to be articulated so that all stakeholders can understand them, including by the non-technical and non-security communities. Getting all stakeholders to sign off on these inherent risks is crucial to ensure that everyone recognises the constraints the solution will be confined by. If you do not have a sound understanding of the risks before work starts on the design, let alone the implementation, then you are lacking an essential part of the solution requirements.
Review, Collaborate, and Iterate
Once you have the security requirements, you can feed them into the design process similar to functional requirements. Selecting appropriate controls to meet the requirements will undoubtedly require some specialist expertise. However, this is similar to the requirement for technical architects to be familiar with the technologies employed in the solution stack.
This design process should be iterative. Requirements change, frequently due to learning in one iteration providing feedback into the next. The security requirements may influence the architectural approach to fulfil the functional requirements. Occasionally, a complete rethink may be required to adjust the functional requirements to meet the security constraints while also meeting the business needs.
However, like the house-building analogy above, this time spent optimising the design will be significantly less than the time, cost, and disruption caused if security is addressed later in the lifecycle.
Each iteration takes the proposed design, reviews the inherent risks to identify any that can be retired or if new ones have been created, assesses the residual risk given the existing security controls, and identifies additional security controls to reduce the residual risk to an acceptable level. Done collaboratively, this can introduce fast feedback into the design process, and, over time, the technical architects will become more familiar with security issues and their resolutions.
Zero Trust’s Role in the Exercise, and Scope Definition
Zero Trust is another trending buzzword frequently camouflaged with mystique, or hijacked as a ‘feature’ on product sheets. My view on Zero Trust is similar to my view on SbD: it should be easy to understand, and ‘does exactly what it says on the tin’. In design and in operations, we start from the baseline that nothing is trusted. Whether it is digital identities, devices, applications, or services, we can only trust them once we have an objective and explicit reason to trust them.
We use the principle of Zero Trust extensively when applying SbD. By having no implicit trust in any identity, device, or service, we can decide on the minimum level of trust we need to enforce and the maximum level of trust that the entity can offer. If the maximum trust on offer is less than the minimum trust we need, then there is a design decision to be made about how we close the gap. It may be necessary to reduce functionality in order to reduce the required minimum. Or, we may need to put in place other compensatory controls to reduce the risk in other ways.
Defining an appropriate scope of the system is key to success. If you set the scope too large, then everything is inside the ‘circle of trust’, and SbD becomes a homogenous exercise in enterprise security. If you set the scope too small then you will drown under the sheer quantity of projects to manage.
The World is not a Greenfield Site, and Security is not a Fire-and-Forget Weapon
The world is not a greenfield site, and there will be challenges retrofitting a SbD approach to the broad portfolio of legacy solutions. There is no simple or quick solution to this, it will be a case of progressively revisiting each project’s architecture and identifying the changes that will make it secure by design.
But, risk can help us here too. Some projects or services will be sufficiently low-risk so that they can be tolerated until they are retired (so long as they are not trusted by any other more important system).
The SbD approach lends itself well to a progressive rollout. SbD will limit the negative impact that a legacy system can have on a target system, because nothing outside of a project’s scope is implicitly trusted. You can only aim for a perfect world by progressively taking steps to make it a better world.
In this article, we explain why risk management needs to be addressed at the design phase of projects. This does not mean that we believe this is the end of the journey. Security and risk management still needs to be managed in operations as new threats change the risk profile, or change is applied to a system. But with the foundations laid early in the lifecycle, the task of management through life becomes easier. The documentation generated by SbD should provide clear traceability between risks and controls. When a project is reviewed in life, the rationale behind previous decisions can be clearly understood, enabling change to be an informed process.
Summary
This article outlines why I believe applying the principles of Secure by Design avoids issues getting into operations, and saves time and money. If what I have described already seems obvious, then that is positive. However, from my experience, too many projects do not consider security to be an essential component of design. I believe that this is a missed opportunity, and, when applied correctly, it delivers solutions that are more secure and easier to manage.
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